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Abstract
Cr oss- countr ycompar isons avoidthe unsteadyeq uilibr ium in whichr egulator s have
to balance between economies ofscale anda su¢cient numberofr emaining compar able
utilities.Bythe use ofData Envelopment Analy sis ( DEA) , we compar e the e¢ciency
ofthe dr ink ing watersectorin the Nether lands, England and W ales, Austr alia, Por -
tugal and Belgium.Af terintr oducing a pr ocedur e to measur e the homogeneity ofan
industr y , r obust or der - m par tial f r ontier s ar e usedto detect outly ing obser vations.By
apply ing bootstr apping algor ithms, bias- cor r ectedr st andsecondstage r esults ar e es-
timated. Ourr esults suggest that incentive r egulation in the sense ofr egulator y and
benchmar kincentive schemes have a signicant positive e¤ect on e¢ciency .Bysuitably
adapting the conditional e¢ciencymeasur es to the bias cor r ectedestimates, we incor -
por ate envir onmental var iables dir ectlyinto the e¢ciencyestimates.W e r stlyeq ualiz e
the social, ph y sical and institutional envir onment, and secondly , deduce the e¤ect of
incentive schemes on utilities as theywouldwor kundersimilarconditions.The analy sis
demonstr ates that in absence ofclearandstr uctur al incentives the aver age e¢ciencyof
the utilities f alls in compar ison withutilities whichar e encour agedbyincentives.
JEL Cl assi cati on:C14 , L5 1, L9 5 , C6 1
Ke ywords:Data Envelopment Analy sis, Bootstr apping, I ncentive Scheme, W aterI n-
dustr y , E¢ciencyMeasur ement
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11 Introduction
The merits of competition are abundantly demonstrated in economic theory. However, a
monopolistic conguration may be desirable in certain activities. Particularly operations with
large sunk costs or increasing returns to scale could lead to a natural monopoly. Irrespective of
ownership, whether private or public owned utilities, every natural monopoly involves welfare
cost to society by creating the quiet life of Hicks (1935), the X- ine¢c ienc y of Leibenstein
(1966) or making ex cess prots. The problem is similar to a principal-agent problem under
asymmetric information. The monopolistic utilities (the agents) have private information
about their ability to transform inputs into outputs. As society (the principal) wants a
guaranteed service at the lowest price possible, the utilities can ex tract information rents.
The objective of society is to minimize the ex traction of information rents while assuring a
satisfactory service. Policy makers can apply a broad range of incentive schemes in order
to reach this goal. The di¤erent institutional frameworks (e.g., divestiture, concession or
yardstick competition) reect the di¤erent regulatory and ideological views among societies.
Especially within local public utilities, ideological views could prevail, mainly if the water
services are deemed services of general interest and not services of general economic interest
and, therefore, should not be subject to competition law.
In this article, we ex amine the role of incentive schemes in the drinking water sector. We
investigate whether regulatory and benchmark incentive schemes ameliorate the e¢ciency of
utilities which are encouraged by incentives. To make abstraction of ideological conicts, we
are considering e¢ciency. Indeed, whatever the ideological background, no one can accept
ine¢ciencies which are, basically, resources left over on the table. This article compares the
incentive schemes of ve di¤erent countries:benchmarking the drinking water sector as in
the Netherlands, privatization as in England and Wales, a strong regulatory framework as
in Australia, municipal provision with private sector participation as in Portugal or di¤erent
levels of public management as in Belgium. To best our knowledge, this is the rst paper
applying international benchmarking in the water sector to the developed countries and trying
to determine the best incentive scheme towards e¢ciency max imization.
In methodological terms, this paper follows the literature on Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA). This nonparametric technique is particularly useful in the e¢ciency measurement of
public utilities where knowledge of the production function is relatively scarce. However, the
rst DEA models su¤er from some serious inconveniences which are dealt with in this article.
Firstly, the models, as developed by Charnes et a l.(1978 ) and Banker et a l.(198 4), did not
allow for statistical inference. Only recently, by the work of Simar and Wilson (1998 ), was
statistical inference introduced. We apply their methodology, which is based on bootstrap-
ping, to determine the bias-corrected rst and second stage results (i.e., with and without
considering the ex ogenous environment). These outcomes are compared to the ones arising
from the more traditional Tobit regressions with censored and truncated samples. Secondly,
the deterministic frontier models are sensitive to outlying and atypical observations. Fol-
lowing Simar (2003), we apply the robust order-m e¢ciencies of Cazals et a l. (2002) to
detect the outlying observations in the sample. These results are compared with the more
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(Andersen and Petersen, 1993), peer ind ex(Torgersen et al., 1996) and the Wilson method
(1993). Thirdly, when comparing the e¢ciency of entities in data sets with a heterogeneous
size, Zhang and Bartels (1998) point out that the average e¢ciencies can not simply be com-
pared. Therefore, we develop an approach based on the bandwidth of the Kernel estimates
and employ the approach to stipulate the homogeneity of a country s drinking water sector.
Finally, almost all two stage procedures su¤er from the separability condition in that the
exogenous environmental variables do not directly inuence the estimated e¢ciency scores.
Only recently, by the conditional e¢ciency estimates of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), this
issue has been tackled. We suitably adapt the conditional e¢ciency analysis to the bias
correction framework in order to obtain the cond itional b iascorrectede¢ciency estimates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional frameworks in
the Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian, Portuguese and Belgian drinking water sector.
Section 3 briey reviews the methodology and literature on the use of DEA in water services.
In section 4, we specify the DEA model and determine the homogeneity in e¢ciency in
the national drinking water sectors. Section 5 starts with an introduction on the bootstrap
methodology as outlined by Simar and Wilson (2000) and continues with describing the rst
stage results. Section 6 determines by the use of censored and truncated Tobit regressions
and by a bootstrapping algorithm the inuential environmental variables. In addition, it
develops and applies the conditional bias corrected e¢ciency estimates. Finally, Section 7
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The institutional framework in the water sector
Many approaches are suggested to solve the principle-agent problem (see, e.g., La¤ont and
Tirole, 1993). Although every government wants a secure drinking water provision at a price
as low as possible, countries have di¤erent ideological views on the extent of state intervention
in the economy which creates di¤erent incentive schemes. In this section, we compare the
incentive schemes implemented in the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, Portugal
and Belgium.
For the ease of understanding, we rst dene the concepts of benchmarking, yardstick
competition and sunshine regulation. Bench mark ing denotes the process of comparing the
current performance of a utility with a reference performance. Therefore, it is only a tool to
improve performances and not a regulatory method per s e. The regulatory methods include
the consequences and the e¤ects of the use of benchmarking, e.g., employed in yardstick
competition. In the water sector, the two existing types of yardstick competition (also referred
to as competition by comparison) are  price yardstick competitionand  sunshine regulation
(Marques, 2006). The former intends to dene the tari¤s and mainly consists of price cap or
revenue cap regulation where the factor X in their formulas are determined by benchmarking
techniques. Suns h ine reg ulation intends to  embarrassthe utilities that reveal an inferior
performance by a public discussion of the e¢ciency scores. Even if sunshine regulation is
not triggered compulsorily (e.g., by a sector-specic regulator), the public display of the
3e¢ciency levels provides transparency in the sector and generates a competitive pressure
which prevents the quiet life of Hicks (1935) and the X-ine¢ciency of Leibenstein (1966).
In the remaining of this paper, we identify sunshine regulation with benchmarking and a
regulatory process with yardstick competition.
2.1 The Netherlands
In the late 1990s, the Netherlands were engaged in a debate on the privatization of water
services. The issue was driven by the Dutch Ministry of Economic A¤airs, which published in
1997 a study on prospects for utilizing market forces in the drinking water sector (Dijkgraaf
et al., 1997). It concluded that privatization might reduce the price of water services by, at
least, 10 percent. The water sector (i.e., the drinking water companies and the waterboards
which are responsible for waste water treatment) was strongly opposed to the privatization
idea. Therefore, the Dutch water companies tried to escape government regulation by using
self-regulation and, in particular, by a voluntary benchmark organized by the Association of
Dutch Drinking Water Companies (Vereniging voor Waterbedrijven in Nederland, VEWIN)
in 1999, 2004 and 2007. The results are remarkable as in a sector with only very low tech-
nological change, the e¢ciency gains over the period 1997-2006 reached 23%. In addition,
thanks to the increased transparency and e¢ciency by the voluntary benchmark, the Dutch
government decided, in 2003, to protect the drinking water sector as a public domain. Nowa-
days, water services are provided by government owned Public Limited Companies (PLCs).
However, through a series of mergers, stimulated by the provincial governments, many PLCs
have grown to a size where they supply a substantial part of a province or more. The scale
increase was initially instigated and enforced by the provinces, as they consider 100.000 con-
nections as the minimal size for the companies to guarantee the best services and quality at
the lowest price. In the 1960s, the Netherlands counted about 200 water supply companies
while in 1980 the number was reduced to about 100. There was a further reduction to 60 in
1990. In 2000 there were only 20 PLCs left for about 16 million inhabitants (Kuks, 2001).
The number further declined to 13 drinking water companies at the end of 2006. However,
recent research indicates that the e¢ciency gains can not be attributed to merger economies,
all the more to the incentive mechanisms (De Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2007).
2.2 England and W ales
As early as in 1984, the Thatcher Government advanced plans to privatize the drinking
water sector in England and Wales. After a public outcry, the plans were suspended until
the reelection in 1987. By the Water Act of 1989, the ten regional water authorities which
were responsible for water quality, supply and sanitation, since the nationalization of the
water industry in 1974, were privatized and oated on the London Stock Exchange. The
Water Act gave the newly established PLCs a 25 year concession for sanitation and water
supply. The existing 29 private water companies were also licensed and continued to operate
in their respective area (Lobina and Hall, 2001).
4Privatization entails a change in ownership, nancing and regulatory structure of the in-
dustry. Three regulatory agencies were created: an environmental regulator (Environment
Agency), a drinking water quality regulator (Drinking Water Inspectorate) and an economic
regulator (the O¢ce of Water Services, OFWAT). For our purpose, only OFWAT is of rele-
vance. OFWAT uses a price-cap regulation which limits the annual growth rate of the water
price for every water company by a factor K. The variable K is calculated as the growth
rate of the Retail Prices Index (RPI ) minus a productivity factor X which is determined
by comparing the performances of the water utilities (i.e., by benchmarking). The price
cap regulation creates an incentive to increase e¢ciency and innovation as this will reduce
expenditures in addition to the revenue allowed by the price-cap.
2.3 Australia
The regulatory framework of the Australian water sector has several appealing characteristics.
The Australian governments, both at state and federal levels, were able to take advantage of
the strengths and weaknesses of the UK and USA older regulatory models. Thanks to the
regulatory procedures close to the American ideas of transparency, enactment and account-
ability and to the typical UK performance incentives through benchmarking and yardstick
competition, a unique incentive scheme based on strict regulation arose. Note that, Australia
has been the pioneer of benchmarking in the water industry as even prior to the rst American
and English studies, Australia developed already research documents about benchmarking.
Since 1994, the Australian Government Council, in the scope of the National Competition
Policy, has decided to reform the water industry and dened a clear policy and strategy for
these sectors to full in 10 years (until 2005). Among other measures, the reforms in these
sectors aimed at its corporatization and sustainability, dening, for example, the legality of
the user /payer principle and the total costs recovery (National Competition Policy, 1998).
2.4 Portugal
In Portugal, except for Lisbon, the water service responsibility belonged until the 1990s ex-
clusively to the municipalities. Private sector participation has only been allowed since 1993.
In addition, the reform created the multimunicipal systems which provide bulk water to
at least two municipalities and require a predominant investment by the State for reasons of
national interest. The remaining organizational forms are called municipal systems, even
though they could be managed by an association of municipalities. The regulatory reform
includes the possibility of direct operation and management of the multimunicipal systems
by the State, the municipalities or their associations. It allows for concessions of the mu-
nicipal systems management and operation to companies, irrespective of capital shareholder,
or to users associations. In 1998, the establishment of municipal companies was regulated
according to three frameworks, corresponding to only one municipality, more than one mu-
nicipality (intermunicipal company) and to one or more municipalities with a private partner
with minor shareholding (mixed company). The latter is subject to a public tender. A state
public company, Empresa Portuguesa de Águas Livres (EPAL), is responsible for the water
5service of Lisbon,but it embodies an atypical situation in Portugal.
2.5 Belgium
Although Belgium is a federal country and the drinking water supply has been a regional
policy since 1980 (i.e., competition of the Flemish and the Walloon government), price regu-
lation remains a federal issue. Within the drinking water sector, the decisions by the pricing
commission are considered as rather ad hoc and only based on the current costs. By law,
drinking water supply is the responsibility of the municipalities although four di¤erent or-
ganizational structures can be distinguished. Firstly, both in the Flemish and the Walloon
region, municipalities have organized themselves into intercommunales. Intercommunales
are a typical Belgian structure which gives the organized municipalities corporate personality.
Secondly, if the municipalities refrained from supplying drinking water to their inhabitants,
the regional drinking water company (former national) provides water to this area. This
regional company is called the Vlaamse Maatschappij voor Watervoorziening (VMW) in
the Flemish region and the Société Wallonne De Eaux (SWDE) in the Walloon region. A
third and fourth organizational structure are municipal water suppliers and municipal ser-
v ices. These utilities, respectively, do have and do not have technical and nancial autonomy.
There are no structural incentives in the sector (De Witte, 2006).
3 International benchmarking by DEA
In this study, we will benchmark the Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian, Portuguese
and Belgian drinking water utilities against each other. To obtain a comparison of the cur-
rent performance against a reference performance (and hence to benchmark), we assume a
common frontier technology, allowing utilities from di¤erent countries to support the enve-
lope. Alternatively, we can establish a national frontier production function in which only
a countrys own rms may be best practices. Since a whole range of methodologies exist to
determine performance scores based on production estimates, it is important to identify the
strengths and limitations of these techniques (for a survey, see Berg, 2006). We use Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate the production frontier. We rst focus on some
advantages of cross-country comparisons.
3.1 Cross- country comparisons
Regulators balance between economies of scale (i.e., mergers in the drinking water sector)
and a su¢cient number of remaining comparable companies. In this respect, cross-country
comparisons o¤er some advantages. Firstly, studies which compare the e¢ciency of drinking
water companies in di¤erent countries o¤er the possibility to escape the unsteady equilibrium
between economies of scale and the number of comparators. Secondly, one can use a larger
database to benchmark the national best practices. The possibility that a national best
practice remains the reference in an enlarged data set decreases, which provides additional
6incentives to the best performing rms of a country. A third advantage arises from the
potentially closer approximation to the world best-practice frontier (Estache et al., 2004). In
this article, we develop a fourth advantage of cross-country comparisons as we would like to
examine objectively the e¤ectiveness of incentive schemes. Therefore, in an international data
set, we measure the e¢ciency of the water utilities by the use of DEA. After correcting bias
in the e¢ciency estimates and after taking into account environmental factors, which are out
of control of the rms management, we evaluate the e¤ect on e¢ciency of a benchmarking
and regulation incentive scheme.
However, international benchmarking raises some particular di¢culties. The most in-
tricate issue is the lack of comparability of the data as national regulators dene concepts
slightly di¤erently. Even in national benchmark studies, interpretation of denitions and
measurement of variables could di¤er. Secondly, exchange rate uctuations are important
when comparing monetary units. Thirdly, the unequal extent of outsourcing in the di¤erent
countries inuences the total number of employees (and the sta¤ cost). Fourthly, some coun-
try specic di¤erences are beyond the control of the rms managers. Dissimilarities such as
wage rates, taxes or rates of return on capital could induce di¤erent policy options (Jamasb
and Pollitt, 2001). Finally, heterogeneity creates di¤erences between countries which could
be falsely taken as ine¢ciencies.
In this article, we try to take into account these concerns by focusing on four specic as-
sumptions. Firstly, we adopt variables in quantities (e.g., the inputs sta¤ and mains length)
that are less susceptible to the lack of comparability. Secondly, the major di¤erences among
countries are related to taxation issues. However, thanks to the quantities variables, tax
heterogeneity does not signicantly inuence the model. Indeed, higher water prices should
reduce the consumption, although this is not empirically observed. Nevertheless, in second
stage analysis, we include variables for water consumption per capita and relative wealth of
consumers. Thirdly, also other heterogeneous factors which characterize the operational and
institutional environment are integrated in the second stage analysis of the model. Fourthly,
an important aspect not completely integrated in this article is the level of outsourcing. Al-
though these data are not available, we contacted the professional associations of the water
sector which conrmed that the degree of outsourcing is more or less the same among the
countries in the analysis. Notice for example, in our sample, the Australian water services,
which may seem very di¤erent from the others, correspond only to major cities of Australia,
and thus, are more comparable to the other observations. Fifthly, we identify the outliers
by several methods, so that atypical observations are eliminated from the sample and homo-
geneity of the data set increases.
3.2 Determining e¢ciency
From 1985 until the beginning of 2006, around 40 DEA applications to the water services
were carried out. The case-studies which were made public amount to 30. The most fre-
quently cited studies are referred to in Table 1 and will be briey described next. The
objectives of these studies are diverse, although most of them focus on the water services
7(WS) performance measurement with regulatory aims. The protagonists are generally acad-
emic or regulatory authorities. The models entail 13 countries, namely the USA, Australia,
UK, Denmark, Norway, Japan, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands
and Brazil. Out of these case-studies, 12 comprise both the water supply, the sewerage and
the sewage treatment;12 comprise only the water supply;3 the sewerage and 3 the sewage
treatment separately. The 30 studies mentioned correspond to 38 distinct models. These are
mostly input-oriented. Only two studies concern non-oriented models. Without including
the units, the studies comprise 23 inputs, 22 outputs and 20 di¤erent explanatory factors.
The most frequently adopted inputs are the sta¤, the operational expenditures (OPEX),
the energy and the mains length. The leading outputs are the distributed (revenue) water
volume, the number of customers and the network length, while the main explanatory factors
are the water source (or the associated treatment), the water volume distributed by type of
customer and the density of inhabitants (or customers). Table 2 systematizes the inputs,
outputs and explanatory factors which are used more than three times by at least more than
one article.
Table 1: Main DEA studies
S tu dy O b ject Fo cu s R esults
AC T (1995) A ust.;E & W AC T E W p erform ance Signi cant ine¢ ciency level
A ida et al. (1998) 108 W S from Japan M arket structure Sm aller size, m ore e¢ cient
A ncarani et al. (2000) 37 W S from Italy Italian W S p erform ance Ine¢ ciency balanced by e¤ ectiveness and high quality
A ncarani (2000) 154 W S from Sicily (It.) M arket struc.-ow nersh P resence of scale and scop e econom ies
A nw andter and O zuna (2002) 110 W S from M exico M arket structure M unicipalization and regulation w ithout p ositive results
B osw orth et al. (1996) 10 W S from E & W W S R egulation Signi cant ine¢ ciency level
B rynes (1986) 143 W S from the U SA O w nership R esults dep end on the m o del
B rynes et al. (1986) 127 W S from the U SA O w nership Indi¤ erence b etw een public and private
C ubbin and T zanidakis (1998) 29 W S from E & W W S R egulation D i¤ erences according to the com putation m etho d
D ijkgraaf et al. (1997) W S from N etherlands D utch W S p erfor. W S ine¢ ciency of 15%
K S (2003) 96 W S from D enm ark D anish W S p erfor. Sign. p otential of technical and e¢ ciency earnings
L am b ert et al. (1993) 271 W S from the U SA O w nership P ublic m ore e¢ cient
L iang (2003) 11 W S from A ustralia W S p erform ance Signi cant average ine¢ ciency
L ondon E conom ics (1995) 30 W S E & W ;6 A ust W S p erform ance A ust. w ith high e¢ ciency b ene t from their consum ption
M arques and M onteiro (2003) 45 Portuguese W S W S p erform ance P rivate m ore pro ductive
M arques and M onteiro (2005) 70 Portuguese W S W S p erform ance H igh e¢ ciency earnings p otential
N orm an and Stoker (1991) 25 W S from E & W M arket structure E ¢ ciency as the m ost im p ortant asp ect
T hanassoulis (2000a, 2000b) 32 W S from E & W W S R egulation Sign. cost savings and D E A advantages in regulation
Tupp er and R esende (2004) 20 B razilian state W S W S R egulation Signi cant cost savings and Y C p otential
Wo o d et al. (1997) W S from E & W W S p erform ance Signi cant ine¢ ciency level
Wo o dbury and D ollery (2003) 73 W S from N SW (A ) W S p erform ance A verage ine¢ ciency of 26.5%
3.3 Data Envelopment Analysis model
The DEA approach constructs the above mentioned nonparametric frontier as the piecewise
linear combination of all e¢cient Decision Making Units (DMUs) in a sample. The generic
DEA model was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) (1978). As their model
assumed constant returns to scale (CRS), Banker et al. (1984) extended this to variable
returns to scale (VRS). The extension involves the introduction of a convexity constraint
ensuring that DMUs are only compared with similar DMUs (e.g., similar size). The essen-
tial characteristic of the CCR-model is the reduction of a multiple-output / multiple-input
situation for each DMU, to that of a virtual-output / virtual-input. The technical e¢ciency
measure is calculated as this ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs.
8Table 2: Inputs, outputs and explanatory factors adopted in the bibliographic references
Explanatory




Customers number 1 17
Mains length 15 10
Water source/treatment 1 2 14
Sta¤ 16 2
Energy 11 1
Distributed water volume 28
Volume by customer class 3 12
Reagents costs 4
Miscellaneous costs 5
Other OPEX (without sta¤) 6
Customers / Population density 8
Revenues 4
Peak factor 2 6
Water losses 4 2 5
Assume there are n DMUs to be evaluated, each consuming a varying amount of m di¤erent
inputs, to produce s di¤erent outputs. In particular, DM Uj consumes an amount xjiof in-
put i and produces yjr of output r. We label the evaluated observation by the subscript o.
The DEA-CRS model with input-orientation, which searches for the minimum proportion of










 1; i = 1;2;: : : ;n
r > 0;j > 0; for a l lr;j :
To obtain the technical e¢ciency score  for each of the n DMUs, the linear programming
problem needs to be repeated n times. The set of normalizing constraints (one for each
DMU) reects the condition that the virtual output to the virtual input ratio of every DMU
is less than or equal to unity. DM Uo is e¢cient if and only if its e¢ciency score  = 1 while
an ine¢cient DMU is denoted by  < 1.
Remark that, if the number of DMUs in the sample increases from n to n + p, the only
change in the model is the addition of p normalization constraints. Due to the implying
reduction of the feasible solution set, the new optimal solution for any existing DMU must
be less or equal to the previous optimal solution. Therefore, by construction, joining separate
data sets does not increase the e¢ciency scores of the individual DMUs in comparison with
the separate analysis. This is an important aspect in international benchmark studies as the
combination of national databases increases the number of observations.
94 Data and indicators
Choosing the input and output variables is the most important stage in any DEA assessment
as the results are highly inuenced by this choice (Section 4.1). Kittelsen (1993) proposes a
statistical procedure to analyze the selection of the variables, which we apply to the choice
of the orientation (i.e., input versus output) and the option of returns to scale (i.e., constant
versus variable) (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 compares the homogeneity in e¢ciency among the
countries in the data set. We partly tackle the intricate comparability of data by considering
only non-monetary variables which are less a¤ected by purchasing power and exchange rates.
However, as denitions could still slightly di¤er between countries, we carefully examine the
results and test them on outliers (Section 4.4). In international comparisons, it is appealing
to estimate the technical e¢ciency of companies as the goal of maximizing technical e¢ciency
is not in conict with any other goals. Indeed, ine¢ciencies are, basically, resources left over
on the table.
4.1 The data
The data are obtained from various sectors organizations. One has to be very careful by
the slight di¤erences in denitions. As we are not competent to make these specications
uniform, we just copy the data from the national databases. The Dutch data are deduced
from the Benchmark studies and the annual Water Supply Statistics organized by VEWIN.
The latest year available is 2005. The English and Welsh data are obtained from the June
Return by OFWAT which collects information from each of the water companies. Most data
tables contain information from the 1997-2005 period. The Australian data are obtained by
means of Water Services Association of Australia facts, published annually (since 1996) by
the Water Services Australian Association that compiles and audits the data. The data of the
Portuguese water services are collected directly by the annual accounts and activity reports
produced by the utilities. As some technical data were sometimes missing in the reports, the
companies were contacted in order to provide them. Data on the Belgian water industry are
compiled by Belgaqua, the Belgian umbrella organization, since 1993. In contrast to other
countries, the most recent year available is 2004.
Descriptive statistics for the various countries are presented in Table 3. The di¤erence in
utility size is large, as revealed by the averages in the di¤erent columns. An average English
and Welsh water company counts 14 times more employees than a private Portuguese rm.
Also productivity, measured by the number of connections per employee, di¤ers signicantly.
A Dutch employee handles 4 times more connections than his Portuguese colleague.
4.2 M odel specication
DEA models should, as much as possible, reect the consumed resources and the produced
outputs. The inputs of our DEA model consist of labor and capital. We proxy labor input
by the number of employees (in full time equivalents). Measuring labor in a single aggregate
variable implicitly assumes a uniform skill distribution across rms. Ideally, we should make a
10Table 3: Descriptive statistics, average country values 2005
.
number average average average average connections
of number of length of volume of number of per
DMUs employees mains (km) water (m
3) connections employee
the Netherlands 13 379 8,867 87,538,462 565,462 1490
England - Wales 23 1,306 14,540 242,703,893 913,975 699
Australia 17 464 5,450 118,735,000 340,330 862
Portugal - public 29 193 778 9,719,033 70,551 366
Portugal - private 15 91 590 4,948,958 35,793 391
Belgium* 25 226 3,550 23,924,449 136,592 604
*2004 data
Table 4: Kittelsen test - orientation
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. mean
Input-oriented - E0 0.6324 0.5786 0.2389
output-oriented - E1 0.6162 0.5733 0.2551
Method df Value Probability
t-test 121 2.4340 0.017
Wilcoxon signed-rank 2.8620 0.014
Table 5: Kittelsen test - returns to scale
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. mean
CRS - E0 0.5464 0.4989 0.2351
VRS - E1 0.6324 0.5786 0.2389
Method df Value Probability
t-test 121 6.3090 0.0000
Wilcoxon signed rank 6.3150 0.0000
11distinction between three categories: unskilled labor, skilled labor and management (Estache
et al., 2004). However, this disaggregation seems not to be available. By including per capita
Gross Regional Product (GRP) in the second stage (see infra), we try to control for the
di¤erences in skill distributions. The length of mains (in kilometers) is used as a proxy for
capital inputs. We prefer the length of mains to the capital expenditures as it is easier to
measure and less prone to inaccuracies from variations in estimating current construction
and exchange rates. The outputs in the model reect the main activities from the drinking
water companies, i.e., the companies have to deliver water to their customers. We use the
volume of delivered water as a rst output indicator (in m3), while the number of connections
is applied as the second output variable.
The relative nature of DEA makes it, as in every empirically oriented methodology, vul-
nerable to problems with the degrees of freedom. The number of degrees of freedom will
increase with the number of DMUs in the data set, and decrease with the number of input
and output variables. Banker et al. (1989) suggest a rough rule of thumb. Let m be the
number of inputs and s be the number of outputs used in the analysis, then the sample size
n should satisfy n  maxfm  s;3 ( m + s)g. This rule of thumb is satised in our analysis.
We use the procedure of Kittelsen (1993) to decide on the orientation of the DEA model.
Kittelsen tests whether a change in model specication signicantly changes the results. If
we denote the e¢ciency of company i measured by an input and output-oriented DEA model
by, respectively, E0
i and E1
i , the hypothesis can be formulated as:
H0 : E0
i = E1
i H1 : E0
i < E1
i : (2)
Several statistics are proposed to test these hypotheses. We compare the mean e¢ciencies
by the ordinary paired t-test (in particular, two sided for the input-output test, while one
sided for the CRS-VRS test), while the median e¢ciencies are compared by the nonparametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The e¢ciency scores are computed by the use the statistical
program R and its package FEAR developed by Paul Wilson (2005). The test results
are presented in Table 4. Firstly, the input-oriented model does signicantly di¤er from
the output-oriented model, so that a choice has to be made. As water utilities are obliged
to supply all customers and as they cannot encourage the consumption (i.e., demand side
management policy), the input-oriented approach is preferred. In the remaining of this paper,
we will only compute the input-oriented DEA-scores. Secondly, to determine the returns to
scale, let E0
i and E1
i denote, respectively, the e¢ciency of company i in an input-oriented
DEA-model with constant and variable returns to scale. The test results in Table 5 show
that the CRS-model signicantly di¤ers from the VRS-model, so that a choice with respect
to returns to scale has also to be made. We apply the VRS model as this assumption is less
stringent and ensures that DMUs are only compared with similar DMUs. In addition, the
water utilities cannot change its size in the short-term.
4.3 Homogeneity in e¢ciency
By restricting the data set to companies of the same country, we obtain a national e¢ciency
comparison. In this case, every DMU is compared with companies of its own nationality.
12Table 6: Homogeneity in e¢ciency
Bandwidth Average e¢ciency
the Netherlands 0.1813 0.8330




Portugal - public 0.2993 0.7232
Portugal - private 0.0040 0.9864
Hence, as in De Witte (2006), we interpret the average national e¢ciency as a measure for
the homogeneity in e¢ciency of a countrys drinking water sector. Indeed, by construction,
DEA detects the relatively most e¢cient rms which determine the e¢ciency of the relatively
less e¢cient rms. If all companies in the data set are rather similar (i.e., homogeneous), the
individual DEA e¢ciency scores will be higher. This results in a higher average e¢ciency of
the country.
Zhang and Bartels (1998) point out that the average e¢ciencies cannot simply be com-
pared. On average, the technical e¢ciency score of a DMU will decrease as the sample size
increases. To equalize the size of the data sets, we resample the e¢ciency scores by a proce-
dure which comprises three steps. Firstly, for every country, we compute the input-oriented
DEA-VRS e¢ciency scores as described in Section 4.2. Secondly, by the use of the code
FEAR (Wilson, 2005), we determine the optimal bandwidth for a nonparametric Kernel
function of the e¢ciency estimates. Following Simar and Wilson (2006), we use the unbiased
cross-validation criterion which minimizes the estimate of the mean-integrated square error.
Although the Kernel density estimate also depends on the size of the data set, the sample size
issue is only of minor importance (cf., the empirical rule approximating the cross-validation
principle equals h = 1:06mi n(s2m;r2m=1:34 )(2m) 1=5 where 2m denotes the reected data,
s2m the standard deviation of 2m and r2m the interquartile range). The bandwidth of every
country is presented in Table 6. Finally, we resample the original DEA-VRS e¢ciency scores
to obtain s values drawn from a Kernel estimate of the bounded density of the e¢ciency
estimates (i.e., the estimates are bounded above at one). We set s equal to 44, the size of
the largest data set. The average resampled e¢ciencies are presented in the third column of
Table 6. Remark that the sample size bias could have been avoided by the use of the robust
order-m e¢ciency scores of Cazals et al. (2002) as well (for a simulated example, see De
Witte and Marques, 2007a).
It turns out that the e¢ciency in the Belgian drinking water sector is the most homo-
geneous, closely followed by the Netherlands. In those two countries, it should be relatively
easy for policy makers to adopt new laws which are generally approved by all water utilities.
Portugal ends as the most heterogeneous country in e¢ciency. Nevertheless, the high hetero-
geneity can especially be attributed to the public sector. The e¢ciency of private Portuguese
drinking water companies seems to be very similar to each other.
134.4 Outlier detection
Inuential data a¤ect the e¢ciency results of a signicant number of other DMUs. In other
words, part of the e¢cient DMUs are the peers of other DMUs, while the remaining e¢cient
DMUs are just peers of themselves or of a reduced number of DMUs. Actually, the identi-
cation of inuential e¢cient DMUs becomes fundamental in DEA analysis, specially if they
can be considered outliers, and for that reason can be taken out of the sample, or if they are
regarded as true benchmarks and, therefore, essential to the benchmarking analysis. The
opposite case of outliers presence, but with ine¢cient DMUs, has little e¤ect in the analysis,
except with regard to that DMU itself. We will neglect this case here.
4.4.1 Theoretical background
A major drawback of DEA lies in its deterministic nature, in that the frontier model assumes
Prob((x;y)  	) = 1 (3)
where 	 denotes the attainable set (	 = f(x;y)  R+jx can produce yg). DMUs located
in the interior of 	 operate technically ine¢cient, while rms on the boundary of 	 are
technically e¢cient. Equation (3) states that deterministic models do not allow for outliers.
Outlying observations could arise from measurement errors, noise and inuential observations
(e.g., atypical data) or observations with favorable values on a specic variable. Although
our data are obtained from national regulators and sector organizations, measurement errors
could arise from the di¤erent denitions operated. Therefore, outlier detection procedures
are employed in this and the next section. Due to the specic characteristics of each out-
lier procedure, several techniques to identify outliers have to be evaluated (De Witte and
Marques, 2007b).
Firstly, a simple outlier determination procedure is the computation of the peer count
index (Charnes et al., 1985). This involves the computation of the number of times an
e¢cient DMU is peer of an ine¢cient DMU. Both higher and lower values point to the
presence of outliers.
Secondly, Andersen and Petersen (1993) compute the super-e¢ciencies which calculate
to what extent the e¢cient DMUs can increase their inputs by keeping themselves technically
e¢cient (input-oriented), or vice-versa, reduce their outputs and at the same time continue
to be e¢cient (output-oriented). In numerical terms, the procedure consists in taking out
the e¢cient DMUs themselves at the moment of their evaluation, so that the e¢ciency can
be higher than 1. Observations with high values are suspected to be outliers.
Thirdly, in spite of sorting the e¢cient DMUs with regard to the e¢ciency surpluses,
super-e¢ciency does not say anything about their sorting according to the importance of the
e¢cient DMUs as reference or benchmarking element for the ine¢cient DMUs of the sample.
A hypothesis of measuring the suitability of the e¢cient DMU to be best practice consists
of computing the indicator , called the peer index, of the e¢cient DMUj for the input k,









where ij denotes the weight of the e¢cient DMUj for the ine¢cient DMUi, xki the input
k of DMUi and xP
ki represents the target (score at the frontier) for the input k of DMUi.
The measure k
k expresses the percentage of the potential reduction of an input k that is
represented by the ine¢cient DMUs which depend on the e¢cient DMUj. The higher the k
k,
the larger the possibilities of employing that DMU for benchmarking or in other perspective
the larger the possibility that it is an outlier.
Fourthly, Wilson (1993) uses in his descriptive model the relative change due to the
deletion of i observations from the sample. As a multi-output extension of the geometric
inuence function R
(i)





min)) examines the separation between the smallest ratios. This ratio
is computed for each of the possible subsets L of size i. The choice of i, the stopping point





combinations). Nevertheless, to avoid a masking e¤ect by which one outlier
could be hidden behind another with similar values, i should be large enough.
Finally, Simar (2003) uses the robust order-m e¢ciencies of Cazals et al. (2002). Instead
of using all the observations to determine the e¢cient frontier (i.e., a full frontier), the order-
m partial frontier uses a sample of size m which is drawn from the total sample with size
n. Whereas a full frontier indicates for all rms which produce at least level y of outputs
the minimum achievable lower boundary of inputs, the expected frontier function of order-m
is the expected minimal input achieved by any m rms drawn from the population of rms
which produce at least y outputs. With an order-m input oriented frontier, an observation
which lies far above the frontier (i.e., a value considerably larger than 1) will be determined
as an outlier.
Detecting outliers
The results of the peer index, super-e¢ciency, peer count and Wilson are presented in Table 7,
while order-m e¢ciencies are shown in Table 8. The former four methods can be considered
as the most traditional outlier detection procedures. There seems to be a high consensus
among the three methods, although concerning the super-e¢ciency we can only label Dwr
Cymry, Lisboa and Thames for sure as suspected outliers (the other observations have a
lower super-e¢ciency value). The three methods identify the same 5 Belgian, 4 Dutch, 3
Australian, 1 English, 1 Welsh and 1 Portuguese rms as possible outliers. These outlying
observations di¤er from the Wilson (1993) analysis in which we equalized i to 12. As the
separation is relatively large for i=1,5 and 8, we regard the corresponding observations as
outliers (details are available upon request). As the order-m results are inuenced by the
value of m, we compute the order-m e¢ciency score for di¤erent values of m. Following the
example by Simar (2003), we use 200 Monte-Carlo replications in computing the estimates.
As it is di¢cult to decide on an appropriate value from which on an observation should be
15Table 7: Outlier detection: traditional methods and Wilson (1993)
Peer count index Super-e¢ciency Peer index Employees Mains Wilson
Brisbane 1 Brisbane 1,033 Brisbane 0,011 0,009 Anglian
Calamine 46 Calamine 1,025 Calamine 0,090 0,070 Dwr Cymru
Chimay 9 Chimay 1,210 Chimay 0,020 0,014 Severn Trent
City West 44 City West 1,243 City West 0,068 0,070 South West
Dwr Cymry 24 Dwr Cymry 8,296 Dwr Cymry 0,040 0,075 SWDE
DZH 20 DZH 1,114 DZH 0,103 0,132 Thames
Evides 16 Evides 1,057 Evides 0,143 0,184 V.M.W.
Hulpe 10 Hulpe 1,200 Hulpe 0,005 0,009 Vitens
IWVA 29 IWVA 1,749 IWVA 0,077 0,026
Lisboa 35 Lisboa 3,720 Lisboa 0,074 0,042
Thames 14 Thames infeasible Thames 0,128 0,161
TWM 52 TWM 1,094 TWM 0,063 0,080
Waimes 4 Waimes 1,250 Waimes 0,000 0,001
WLB 53 WLB 1,203 WLB 0,114 0,071
Yarra 12 Yarra 1,052 Yarra 0,065 0,056
Table 8: Outlier detection: Simar (2003)
m=10 St.E. m=40 St.E. m=60 St.E. m=80 St.E.
Dwr Cymry 19.57 12.27 Dwr Cymry 7.722 7.63 Dwr Cymry 4.660 5.90 Dwr Cymry 3.681 5.24
Lisboa 10.06 6.35 Lisboa 4.560 3.12 Lisboa 3.415 2.92 Lisboa 2.748 2.63
Thames 6.505 6.06 Thames 2.767 1.64 City West 2.270 1.70 City West 1.979 1.59
City West 5.710 3.45 City West 2.623 1.85 WLB 1.984 1.07 Thames 1.693 0.78
Coliban 5.461 3.33 WLB 2.256 1.18 Thames 1.875 1.04 A.W.W. 1.686 0.84
South East 4.455 3.71 A.W.W. 2.123 1.00 A.W.W. 1.812 0.90 WLB 1.648 0.95
Yarra 4.391 3.54 Brisbane 2.079 0.91 Gold Coast 1.725 0.87 Gold Coast 1.566 0.81
Brisbane 4.332 3.06 Gippsland 2.066 1.34 Brisbane 1.715 0.75 Brisbane 1.528 0.69
Gippsland 4.175 2.52 Gold Coast 1.986 1.00 Gippsland 1.697 1.05 Sidney 1.509 0.59
Sidney 4.102 4.23 Portsmouth 1.973 1.05 Portsmouth 1.666 0.87 Three Val. 1.432 0.44
WLB 4.097 1.88 Coliban 1.947 2.03 Sidney 1.588 0.65 Portsmouth 1.409 0.72
Yorkshire 4.045 5.12 South East 1.875 0.98 South East 1.573 0.68 South East 1.408 0.58
United Util. 3.993 4.04 Porto 1.742 1.09 Three Val. 1.498 0.49 United Util. 1.368 0.48
Portsmouth 3.886 1.71 United Util. 1.737 0.76 United Util. 1.483 0.64 Yorkshire 1.342 0.44
Severn Trent 3.730 3.89 Sidney 1.719 0.68 Oeiras 1.461 0.68 South Sta¤s 1.327 0.39
16determined as an outlier (i.e., what is considerably larger than one?), we consider the 15
most outlying observations as outliers. On average, there are 6 DMUs which are stipulated
as outliers by all 4 methods.
As the results of the peer index, sensitivity analysis and peer count index are closely related,
we consider these procedures as more robust. In the remaining of this article, from the
sample of 122 observations we eliminate the 15 outlying DMUs as determined by the more
traditional procedures, so that we obtain a data set of 107 observations.
5 First stage analysis
5.1 Bootstrap method
The deterministic nature of DEA creates several problems. Above, we dealt with the aspect of
inuential observations, while this section tackles the problem of noise in the data. Although
the applied researcher can only estimate the observed production frontier by the use of DEA,
the literature interprets the estimates as the true frontier. Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000)
make a clear distinction between the true (e.g., (x;y)) and the estimated concepts (e.g.,
^ (x;y)). The DEA e¢ciency estimates are prone to uncertainty due to sampling variation.
By the use of a bootstrap methodology, Simar and Wilson allow to carry out traditional
statistical inference in DEA.
The bootstrap procedure, as invented by Efron (1979), is useful if the sampling properties
of estimators are di¢cult to obtain analytically. The bootstrap approximates the sampling
distribution by reproducing the data generating process (DGP). This is the statistical model
which describes the process that yields the observed data in the sample. The DGP follows the
principle that, restricted to the relations between inputs and outputs, the stochastic elements
in the productive process are totally encompassed by the random inputs e¢ciency measures
(hence, we do not assume measurement errors). This makes the DEA estimators biased by
construction as the estimate of the production set ^ 	 is part of the real attainable set 	:
^ 	  	. Therefore, the estimated e¢ciency score, ^ (x;y), is an upward-biased estimator of
the true e¢ciency score (x;y) (for an extensive discussion, see Simar and Wilson, 2006). The
di¤erence is visualized in Figure 1. The bootstrap (with B bootstrap replications) mimics
this estimation and creates a pseudo frontier from which it provides estimates of the sampling
distributions of the bias term ^ (x;y) (x;y). These bootstrap ideas are presented in Figures





Indeed, as ^ (x;y)  1 for all (x;y) 2 	, we only have to deal with one boundary condition for
^ , not two as in the case of ^ . Although the literature describes several approaches to simulate
a bootstrap sample 
n (from the original sample n), only the homogeneous smoothed boot-
strap is here introduced. This approach assumes the distribution of the e¢ciency scores to
be homogeneous over the input-output space (compare with a homoskedasticity assumption
in linear regression models), which allows us to base the bootstrap on the sample estimates
17Figure 1: The true and the DEA frontier
Figure 2: Bootstrap idea
^ i(xi;yi). The eight steps of the bootstrap algorithm are presented in Simar and Wilson
(2006).
Having dened the bootstrap e¢ciencies, a bias-corrected estimator of (x;y) can be
constructed. Therefore, in a rst phase, the bootstrap bias of ^ (x;y) is estimated:





(x;y)   ^ (x;y): (6)
The rst term on the right hand side corresponds to the average of the bootstrap e¢ciency
result and the second term to the original DEA estimate. In a second phase, the bias-corrected
estimator is computed as
^ ^ (x;y) = ^ (x;y)   \ BI ASB(^ (x;y)): (7)
Condence intervals are obtained by means of the percentile method.
18Figure 3: Bootstrap idea (2)
Table 9: Average rst stage bootstrap results
Uncorr. Bias- [ Bias Variance Lower Upper Weighted
e¤. (^ ) corr. (^ ^ ) (^ 
2) bound bound bias-corr.
the Netherlands 1.2158 1.3956 -0.1797 0.0092 1.2343 1.5692 1.3307
England and Wales 1.3583 1.5502 -0.1919 0.0117 1.3792 1.7475 1.4124
Australia 1.4528 1.6653 -0.2125 0.0120 1.4758 1.8575 1.4801
Portugal 1.7540 1.9093 -0.1553 0.0072 1.7776 2.0710 1.7776
Belgium 1.5998 1.8026 -0.2028 0.0111 1.6245 1.9940 2.2693
Portugal - public 1.7607 1.9081 -0.1474 0.0062 1.7843 2.0584 1.7450
Portugal - private 1.7415 1.9117 -0.1702 0.0089 1.7651 2.0946 1.8836
All countries 1.5628 1.7438 -0.1809 0.0096 1.5856 1.9230 1.5243
195.2 First stage results
Having cleared the data set from outlying observations, we proceed to the rst stage analysis
where the input-oriented DEA-VRS model is applied. Average results per country are pre-
sented in Table 9 (detailed results available upon request). The average e¢ciency amounts
to 1.56. This indicates that an average DMU could decrease its inputs by 35.9% (i.e., 1-
1/1.56) while keeping its outputs constant, if it performed as e¢ciently as its benchmark(s).
A benchmark or best practice is a company which performs technically e¢cient and hence
makes part of the DEA frontier. Out of the 107 observations, there are 17 e¢cient DMUs
(15.8%). These companies originate from Belgium (5), England and Wales (4), Australia
(4), the Netherlands (2) and Portugal (2). A DMU with an e¢ciency score higher than 1 is
relatively ine¢cient with respect to its benchmarks.
Recognizing the presence of random noise in the data, we account for noise in the data
(although we can not remove this e¤ect) by estimating DEA corrected e¢ciencies with their
95%-condence intervals. The noise resembles the missing data, the imperfect quality of
the data (even after auditing by regulators) and the atypical results. By a homogeneous
bootstrap, we generate 200 bootstrap samples (the estimated bandwidth yields h = 0:2469
and B = 200). The average bias-corrected estimates are displayed in Table 9. We clearly
notice the upward-bias in the original estimates (i.e., the unconditional estimates are more
e¢cient). In addition, we present the bootstrap estimates of 95%-condence intervals for
which the average width amounts to 0.337. There is only little di¤erence in the condence
interval bandwidth among the ve countries.
Due to the upward-bias in the original estimates and due to the bootstrap correction in the
condence intervals, the original uncorrected estimates lie for every observation outside, but
close to, the lower-bound of the condence interval. However, the bias-corrected estimates lie
for every observation inside the condence intervals. In general, it is important to note that
due to the overlap among the condence intervals, making a relative comparison among the
rms is an intricate issue. In addition, as the original DEA-estimates are biased, they cannot
be interpreted as a ranking device. Notice that, we do not observe condence intervals with a
lower bound of 100% or below. Indeed, as the true e¢ciency of a DMU cannot exceed 100%,
and we measure the 95%-condence intervals, this is a correct observation.
In determining the e¢ciency of an industry as a whole, the average e¢ciency of all DMUs
can have a reduced meaning. Farrell (1957) points out that the industry average should be
computed as a weighted average based on the outputs (or on the inputs). However, when
several outputs (inputs) exist, Farrell does not refer how they are weighted and if we should
use the observed outputs (inputs) or the target outputs (inputs). Here, we opt to weight the
e¢ciency scores by the number of connections as this is a measure for the number of people
who are a¤ected by the relative (in)e¢ciency of a company. The average weighted e¢ciency
scores are presented in the last column of Table 9 and reveal that the Dutch water utilities
are performing most e¢ciently in a weighted as well as in an unweighted scheme. They are
closely followed by the privatized English and Welsh rms. The Portuguese and especially
the Belgian rms lag behind. The next section develops a second stage analysis which tries
to explain the e¢ciency scores by the use of environmental variables.
206 Second stage analysis
The e¢ciency of drinking water utilities is prone to environmental factors which are not
under control of the rms managers. Nevertheless, insight in these factors is important for
evaluating the cost of regulation. If in an input-oriented model an environmental variable z
is unfavorable on e¢ciency, the variable can be considered as an additional and undesired
output variable. The production of this undesired output decreases the e¢ciency as it
absorbs inputs. A favorable environmental variable can be considered as a substitutive input
which could save the use of other inputs in the production process. Section 6.1 addresses the
more conventional Tobit regression and the use of bootstrapping in a second stage analysis.
Section 6.2 applies these theories to the drinking water utilities. In Section 6.3, the e¢ciency
scores are corrected by taking into account the environmental variables.
6.1 Theoretical framework
To explain the e¢ciency of DMUs, researchers have frequently employed a regression model
on the DEA-e¢ciency scores:
^ i = zi + i (8)
where zi is a (row) vector of rm-specic variables which is expected to inuence the ef-
ciency of DMUi.  denotes a vector of parameters to be estimated together with some
statistical noise i. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method will lead to a biased estimate
as it assumes a normal and homoscedastic distribution of the error term and the dependent
variable. However, by construction, the e¢ciency estimates ^ i (= 1
^ i) have a lower limit of 1
which creates a concentration of observations at this single value. This leads to a censored
sample. Tobit models are usually considered to provide a solution whenever there is a mass
of observations at a limiting value.
Simar and Wilson (2007) consider the justication for the use of a censored Tobit re-
gression as nonsense. As ^ i  1, they argue that this involves a truncated rather than
a censored error term. Both censoring and truncation involve a loss of information about
the dependent variable, but where censoring assumes the observation of all right-hand side
variables, truncation supposes an information loss on both sides (left and right-hand side) of
the regression. Therefore,  and  should be estimated by the use of maximum likelihood.
Nevertheless, the standard inference is intricate due to three problems. First, in small sam-
ples, ^ i is highly inuenced by the position of the estimated frontier. As in linear regression
models, this causes correlation among the estimates (^ i). Secondly, also in small samples,
as the input and output variables which determine the DEA-e¢ciency are correlated with
the environmental variables, the error term i will be correlated with zi. These rst two
issues disappear asymptotically. A third and more serious problem is, as mentioned above,
the bias of the DEA-e¢ciency score ^ i towards 1. Simar and Wilson (2007) recommend a
double-bootstrap procedure to produce, with bias-corrected estimates of ^ i, valid condence
interval estimates for the parameters in the second-stage regression.
However, as in the conventional Tobit regressions, the environmental variables zi in the
double-bootstrap procedure do not inuence the boundary of 	. This is due to a separability
21condition: by assumption, the variables of Z lie in a space apart from the production space for
inputs and outputs 	. A second drawback of the described double-bootstrap procedure is the
reliance on some parametric assumptions such as a linear model and a truncated normal error
term. In Section 6.3, we discuss and implement procedures which avoid these assumptions.
6.2 Second stage results
Although many elements in the physical, social as well as the institutional environment
highly inuence the cost level of the drinking water utilities, they lie outside the control of
the rms managers. However, due to the lack of (uniform) data, we make simplications on
the exogenous variables.
A rst physical variable included in the second stage model is the percentage of leak-
age. This variable captures the geographical relief (i.e., more hilly landscape requires more
pressure on the network of pipes which could cause more easily leakage) and the extent of
maintenance (i.e., more leakages correspond to less expenses with maintenance). If the in-
uence of the geographical circumstances outweighs the neglect of maintenance, we expect
a negative inuence on e¢ciency. In the opposite case, we anticipate a positive e¤ect on
e¢ciency. A second physical factor is the percentage of groundwater extraction. The utilities
that abstract more groundwater are supposed to be more e¢cient, since the production cost is
much lower than the counterparts that abstract supercial water or import water from other
utilities. The proportion of water delivered to industrial customers relative to domestic users
is the third, and last, physical variable. It is expected that e¢ciency will change positively
with a higher percentage of industrial customers. The rst social environmental variable,
gross regional product (GRP), captures the relative wealth of the customers, the di¤erence
in skill distribution (see above) and approximates the average productivity of a region. GRP
is measured in per capita purchasing power parity. Water consumption per capita, the second
and last social environmental factor, measures demand side management. We incorporate
ve institutional dummy variables in the second stage analysis. The rst captures the scope
of activities: we assign a dummy variable if the utilitys only activity is providing drinking
water. Evidence from the literature suggests that drinking water services have economies of
scope and therefore they are more e¢cient when they are responsible also for other activities
as a result of the savings obtained with the existing synergies. Corporatization, as a second
institutional factor, is supposed to have a positive e¤ect on e¢ciency thanks to harder budget
constraints. Corporatization is the application by public entities of rules and mechanisms of
the private sector, which enable the public entities to practise a private management. The
third institutional variable denotes the water delivery in one (or maximum three) municipal-
ities. This indication of scale economies is expected to have a negative e¤ect on e¢ciency
(i.e., in accordance to the literature we expect to nd diseconomies of scale; De Witte and
Dijkgraaf, 2007). Finally, we include dummy variables for utilities which have a regulator or
use a kind of benchmarking. We did not assign Portugal with a dummy for benchmarking
as it introduced its benchmarking only in 2005. We expect that these two variables have a
positive e¤ect on e¢ciency.
22In this subsection, we rst evaluate the importance of the environmental inuences. Al-
though Tobit estimates could be possibly biased, it is not clear that bootstrap estimates
are necessarily more reliable (Simar and Wilson (2007) provide only Monte-Carlo evidence).
Comparable results of both estimation techniques will add robustness and condence to the
estimates, therefore, we estimate the Tobit regression of the original as well as of the bias-
corrected e¢ciency estimates in both a censored and a truncated sample. The bias-corrected
e¢ciency estimates are those obtained in the bootstrap analysis of Section 5.2. Note that,
in order to avoid two boundaries, the depend variable (^ ) is larger or equal to one, so that
a positive sign denotes a negative inuence on the e¢ciency (i.e., a favorable environmental
factor), while a negative sign denotes a positive inuence (i.e., an unfavorable environmental
factor). The results are presented in Table 10.
Although in 3 out of 11 estimates the bootstrapping algorithm discovers the opposite
sign of the Tobit regressions, in only 2 cases the Tobit estimates are not covered by the
95%-condence intervals of the bootstrapped variables (see Table 11). To get an idea on how
strongly the di¤erent estimates are related, we present the correlation coe¢cients in Table
12. According to the Pearson measure, the di¤erent estimation techniques are closely related.
This contrasts with the Spearmans rank correlation which reveals a close correlation between
the Tobit regressions, however, no signicant correlation between the Tobit and bootstrap
estimates.
The second stage results in Table 10 indicate that rms which spend less resources on
maintenance, and hence have a higher percentage of leakage, wrongly appear as more e¢-
cient. The positive and signicant Tobit results on groundwater use subvert the postulate
that the use of (cheaper) groundwater increases the e¢ciency. It is highlighted that the
groundwater abstraction in some countries is often associated with the size of utilities. For
example, in Portugal only the small companies have the abstracted water as source. Yet,
more likely than providing an indication for economies of scale (as we capture this e¤ect
later on), the estimation on groundwater use could indicate that only the most e¢cient
companies are capable to purify the most costly surface water. The estimations are incon-
clusive on whether industrial customers encourage the utilities to produce most e¢ciently.
The truncated DEA-VRS and bootstrap second stage method depict a negative e¤ect on
this variable. The social explanatory factor GRP reveals the expected positive inuence on
e¢ciency. The negative inuence on e¢ciency of consumption per capita indicates that the
policies of demand side management are lling up the wished. Hence, the companies increase
the e¢ciency by cost reductions rather than by increasing the water sale. Concerning the
rst of the institutional variables, utilities with activities only in drinking water provision
show a positive signal. This evidence counters the literature in that water services seem not
to have economies of scope. Although the Tobit regressions yield the expected positive e¤ect
of corporatization on e¢ciency, these estimates are not signicantly di¤erent from 0. The
signicant negative e¤ect of corporatization by the bootstrap estimates could be linked with
the fact that corporatization makes the companies comprise all costs, leading them to seem
wrongly ine¢cient. The positive e¤ect on e¢ciency of the variable delivery in one munici-
pality suggests that the water utilities in the sample studied do not have scale economies, an
23observation in line with the literature. The values obtained are always signicant except for
the truncated sample with DEA-VRS e¢ciencies. The results of the regulator (existent or
non-existent) are not much conclusive, although they are not signicant in all cases, except
for the bootstrap. The latter reveals, in correspondence with the literature, a positive e¤ect
of regulation on e¢ciency. Finally, the e¤ect of benchmarking on e¢ciency is positive and
always with signicance. This tool to improve performance turns out to be very appropriate.
Table 10: Second stage results
Dependent variable DEA-VRS e¤. DEA-VRS e¤. bias-corr VRS bias-corr VRS DEA-VRS
Sample assumption censored truncated censored truncated bootstrap
Intercept 3.1285 *** 2.0693 *** 2.7042 *** 3.1409 *** 4.2216 ***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leakage (%) -0.01580 ** -0.000895 -0.007403 -0.01101 -0.02258 ***
(0.020) (0.934) (0.209) (0.245) (0.000)
Groundwater extraction (%) 0.002825 ** 0.002178 0.002231 * 0.003477 * -0.0001359
(0.030) (0.277) (0.059) (0.068) (0.150)
Industry water / household delivery -0.2313 * 0.3487 -0.1026 -0.1772 0.02396 ***
(0.079) (0.313) (0.269) (0.328) (0.000)
Gross regional product (PPP/capita) -4.16 E-5 *** -1.52 E-5 -2.15 E-5 * -3.74 E-5 * -6.879 E-5 ***
(0.004) (0.546) (0.092) (0.085) (0.000)
Consumption per capita 4.56 E-5 ** 5.55 E-5 ** 5.08 E-5 ** 6.08 E-5 ** 5.716 E-5 ***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.015) (0.027) (0.000)
Water unique activity (=1) -0.2461 ** -0.1545 -0.2087 * -0.3362 * -0.2644 ***
(0.049) (0.448) (0.065) (0.073) (0.000)
Corporatization (=1) -0.09583 -0.6898 -0.07701 -0.2759 1.2254 ***
(0.703) (0.188) (0.735) (0.515) (0.000)
Delivery in one municipality (=1) -0.2973 * -0.3443 -0.2943 ** -0.4677 ** -1.3448 ***
(0.062) (0.183) (0.041) (0.049) (0.000)
Regulator (=1) 0.2620 0.6866 0.2056 0.4674 -0.9637 ***
(0.212) (0.162) (0.274) (0.224) (0.000)
Benchmarking (=1) -0.7091 *** -0.7529 ** -0.6198 *** -0.9314 *** -0.1198 ***
(0.002) (0.035) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
SE of regression 0.4424 0.4319 0.4643 0.4692 1.1498
Note: n=107; p-values in brackets; *** denotes signicance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%
Table 11: Bootstrapping estimates - condence intervals
bootstrap 95% conf. int. 95% conf. int.
estimate lower bound upper bound Tobit estimates
intercept 4.2216 *** 1.9184 6.6944 in conf. inter.
leakage (%) -0.02258 *** -0.06406 0.01550 in conf. inter.
groundwater extraction (%) -0.0001359 -0.007760 0.007383 in conf. inter.
industry water / household delivery 0.02396 *** 0.01353 0.03404 no in conf. inter.
gross regional product -6.879 E-5 *** -1.579 E-4 7.980 E-6 in conf. inter.
consumption per capita 5.716 E-5 *** -6.598 E-5 1.714 E-4 in conf. inter.
water unique activity (=1) -0.2644 *** -1.0319 0.4602 in conf. inter.
corporatization (=1) 1.2254 *** -0.3341 2.6574 in conf. inter.
delivery in one municipality (=1) -1.3448 *** -2.4574 -0.3601 some in conf. inter.
regulator (=1) -0.9637 *** -2.1884 0.1741 not in conf. inter.
benchmarking (=1) -0.1198 *** -1.3720 1.1548 in conf. inter.
24Table 12: Correlation coe¢cients among second stage estimates
Pearson n Spearman DEA e¤. DEA e¤. bias-corr DEA bias-corr DEA DEA
cens. trunc. cens. trunc. bootstrap
DEA e¤. Cens. 1.000 0.818 (**) 1.000 (**) 0.991 (**) 0.391
DEA e¤. trunc. 0.912 (**) 1.000 0.818 (**) 0.882 (**) 0.327
bias-corr cens. 0.999 (**) 0.918 (**) 1.000 0.991 (**) 0.391
bias-corr trunc. 0.994 (**) 0.946 (**) 0.994 (**) 1.000 0.382
DEA bootstrap 0.871 (**) 0.668 (**) 0.878 (**) 0.835 (**) 1.000
Note: n=11; ** denotes signicance at 1% level (two-tailed) and * at 5% level (two-tailed)
6.3 Taking into account environmental variables
The above mentioned separability assumption presumes that the environmental variables do
not directly inuence the e¢ciency scores, so that only ex post the inuence of environmental
variables on e¢ciency can be measured. To avoid this assumption, we suitably adapt the
conditional e¢ciency measures of Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) to the statistical inference
framework of Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000). The integration of these two frameworks
has some attractive features as (1) avoiding the separability condition, (2) creating a fully
nonparametric model (i.e., it does not rely on any a priori assumption on the functional
form of the production set) and (3) allowing to explore the inuence of the environmental
variables.
The conditional e¢ciency measure of Daraio and Simar (2005) introduces environmental
variables z in the e¢ciency scores of the evaluated DMU by conditioning on the environmental
variable zo: They propose to use a Kernel with compact support (i.e., K(u) = 0 if juj > 1)
to smooth the variable z and to determine the appropriate bandwidth by the use of the
cross-validation principle. The procedure selects all observations (x;y) in the neighborhood
of zo :
D S
n = fi j (xi;yi) 2 n;jzo   zij 6 hg: (9)
In a multidimensional framework, we rst decorrelate the environmental variables by the use
of a Mahalanobis transformation (see, e.g., Mardia et al., 1979) and afterwards perform a
sequential (Epanechnikov) Kernel estimation.
The Daraio-Simar procedure is suitably adapted to the Simar-Wilson model by, rstly,
computing for each evaluated observation (xo;yo) the appropriate reference set and, secondly,
determining the noise corrected e¢ciency score by the bootstrap procedure, so that we ob-
tain a conditional bias corrected e¢ciency estimate ^ ^ (x;y j z). As an exploratory tool to
visualize the e¤ect of the environmental variable, Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007) suggest to
nonparametrically regress the ratio ^ ^ (x;y j z) = ^ ^ (x;y) (i.e., the conditional bias corrected
e¢ciency estimates to the unconditional estimates) against zi: In the input-oriented model, a
decreasing regression indicates a favorable e¤ect on e¢ciency of z (i.e., if not accounted for,
the e¢ciency score will goes up with z), while an increasing regression species an unfavor-
able e¤ect on e¢ciency (i.e., behaving as a substitutive input). In a multivariate framework,
we nonparametrically regress the ratio of the fully conditioned variables to the partially
conditioned e¢ciency scores against the conditioned variable.
In this article, we are specially interested in the e¤ects of incentive regulation to the ef-
25ciency while taking into account the exogenous inuences. In particular, by employing the
conditional e¢ciency measures, we control for those exogenous characteristics which were
signicant in the DEA-VRS bootstrap method (i.e., controlling for leakage, industry deliv-
ery, GRP, consumption per capita, economies of scope, economies of scale, corporatization,
regulation and benchmarking). Therefore, we can interpret the conditional bias corrected e¢-
ciency scores as if the utilities are facing the same physical, social and institutional constraints
and benets. In comparison to the rst stage results, the conditional e¢ciency estimates,
as presented in Table 13, reduce the e¢ciency of the English and Welsh, the Dutch, the
Australian and the private Portuguese utilities (although, the estimated bias is similar). The
companies obtained higher rst stage estimates thanks to favorable environmental inuences.
Next, we estimate the conditional e¢ciencies without taking into account the e¤ect of incen-
tive regulation (i.e., the benchmarking and regulation dummy). As e¢ciency is reduced in all
countries, we expect to nd a favorable inuence from incentive schemes on e¢ciency. This is
tested by the exploratory graph in Figure 4 where the ratio of the fully conditioned estimates
(i.e., the full set of exogenous characteristics including incentive regulation) to the partially
conditioned estimates (i.e., without incentive regulation) is regressed against the presence
of incentive regulation. The negative monotonic rst order e¤ect indicates that incentive
regulation is favorable on e¢ciency, thus, utilities which are facing incentive regulation, in
the sense of benchmarking or regulation, are producing more e¢ciently.
Together with the second stage results of Section 6.2, this analysis provides signicant
evidence for the positive e¤ects of incentives schemes on e¢ciency. The analysis even demon-
strates that in absence of clear and structural incentives the average e¢ciency of the utilities
even falls in comparison with utilities which are encouraged by incentive regulation. The
natural monopoly in the drinking water sector leads to the quiet life of Hicks (1935) and
X-ine¢ciency of Leibenstein (1966). The presence of benchmarking (in the sense of sun-
shine regulation or yardstick competition) is a key element which replaces competition in the
market or competition for the market by competition by comparison.
Table 13: Conditional bias corrected e¢ciencies
z = physical, social and institutional z = physical and social
Bias- [ Bi a s Lowe r Uppe r Bias- [ Bi a s Lowe r Uppe r
cor r .( ^ ^ ) bound bound cor r .( ^ ^ ) bound bound
theNe the r lands 1 . 8 2 0 - 0 . 1 7 0 1 . 6 5 1 2 . 1 5 2 2 . 0 3 3 - 0 . 1 7 5 1 . 8 5 9 2 . 4 0 2
Eng land and W ale s 2 . 1 2 0 - 0 . 2 1 4 1 . 9 0 6 2 . 4 4 8 2 . 1 4 8 - 0 . 2 1 8 1 . 9 3 0 2 . 4 5 6
Austr alia 1 . 6 1 3 - 0 . 1 6 1 1 . 4 5 2 1 . 8 4 7 1 . 7 3 2 - 0 . 1 6 0 1 . 5 7 2 1 . 9 6 9
Por tug al 1 . 6 9 6 - 0 . 1 4 7 1 . 5 4 9 1 . 9 1 3 1 . 7 0 2 - 0 . 1 5 2 1 . 5 5 2 1 . 9 1 2
Be lg ium 1 . 8 3 8 - 0 . 2 5 8 1 . 5 8 0 2 . 1 4 8 1 . 8 3 1 - 0 . 2 5 1 1 . 5 8 1 2 . 1 2 9
Por tug al -public 1 . 7 2 4 - 0 . 1 4 2 1 . 5 8 1 1 . 9 3 2 1 . 7 2 1 - 0 . 1 4 6 1 . 5 8 4 1 . 9 3 3
Por tug al -pr iv ate 1 . 6 4 5 - 0 . 1 5 6 1 . 4 8 9 1 . 8 7 5 1 . 6 6 5 - 0 . 1 6 5 1 . 4 9 3 1 . 8 7 3
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Figure 4: Impact of incentive regulation
7 Conclusion
This paper has ex plored the e¤ect of incentive schemes in the drink ing water sector. Di¤erent
ideological views on the ex tent of state intervention in the economy create various incentive
structures. We have compared the incentive schemes implemented in the Netherlands, Eng-
land and Wales, Australia, Portugal and Belgium. Our results show large di¤erences in bias
and noise corrected rst stage ine¢ciencies. On average, the benchmark ed Dutch drink ing
water companies are performing better (average e¢ciency score of 1.40) than the privatiz ed
English and Welsh utilities (1.55). However, the strict regulatory model of Australia (1.66),
the municipal provision in Belgium (1.80) and especially the Portuguese municipal provision
with private sector participation (1.90) are lagging behind.
We have interpreted the average  nationale¢ciency score of a country as a measure
for the homogeneity in e¢ciency of a country s drink ing water sector. Since the number of
utilities in the di¤erent national samples di¤er, by resampling we eq ualiz ed the siz es of the
data sets. It turns out that the e¢ciency of the Belgian and Dutch drink ing water sectors
are the most homogeneous. In those two countries, policy mak ers should relatively easily
nd agreement among the utilities to adopt new laws.
The second stage procedures ex amine to which ex tent the ine¢ciencies could be attributed
to (un)favorable physical, social and institutional environmental factors. Therefore, we have
employed censored and truncated Tobit models and a double-bootstrap procedure. The
results detect the negative e¤ect on e¢ciency of the proportion of industrial customers and
groundwater ex traction, the consumption per capita and the e¤ect of a corporate structure.
The portion of leak age, the gross regional product, only supplying drink ing water, the delivery
in only one municipality and the regulatory and benchmarkincentive schemes yield a positive
e¤ect on e¢ciency.
27Finally, we have incorporated the physical, social and institutional environmental factors
in the e¢ciency scores by suitably adapting the conditional e¢ciency measures of Daraio
and Simar (2005) to the bias correction model of Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000). The con-
ditional bias corrected e¢ciency estimates reect e¢ciencies as would the utilities work in
exactly the same environment. With the exogenous inuences equalized, the variation left
between the DMUs can mainly be attributed to managerial inuences. We noticed that the
Dutch, English and Welsh, Australian and private Portuguese utilities are working in a fa-
vorable environment. In addition, our results provide signicant evidence for the positive
e¤ects of incentive schemes on e¢ciency. The analysis demonstrates that in absence of clear
and structural incentives the average e¢ciency of the utilities even falls in comparison with
utilities which are encouraged by incentives. The presence of benchmarking (in the sense of
sunshine regulation or yardstick competition) is a key element which replaces competition in
the market or competition f o rthe market by competition by comparison.
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